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1 Key Laboratory of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China, 2 Department of
Psychology, Peking University, Beijing, China
Accumulated evidence has shown that the subjective time in the sub-second range
can be altered by different factors; some are related to stimulus features such as
luminance contrast and spatial frequency, others are processes like perceptual grouping
and contextual modulation. These findings indicate that temporal perception uses neural
signals involved in non-temporal feature processes and that perceptual organization plays
an important role in shaping the experience of elapsed time.We suggest that the temporal
representation of objects can be treated as a feature of objects. This new concept implies
that psychological time can serve as a tool to study the principles of neural codes in the
perception of objects like “reaction time (RT).” Whereas “RT” usually reflects the state
of transient signals crossing decision thresholds, “apparent time” in addition reveals the
dynamics of sustained signals, thus providing complementary information of what has
been obtained from “RT” studies.
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Introduction
One of the extensively studied temporal topics is duration or interval timing in the sub-second
range, with which a basic experience beyond instantaneity can be obtained (Fraisse, 1984). Such
temporal processing is distinguished from time estimation of supra-second intervals that involves
higher-order cognitive strategies (Fraisse, 1984).Whereas perceptual signal integration across tens to
hundredsmilliseconds is assumed to be automatic and pre-semantic (Pöppel, 1997, 2009), the feeling
of how long an event lasts on this timescale appears to engage some active cognitive processes such
as memory operations. Apparent time and related phenomena are often retrospectively constructed,
and the context in which the temporal pattern is embedded usually exerts a modulatory effect on
the time that one experiences (Eagleman, 2008; Bao et al., 2013). This retrospective and context-
sensitive characteristic has also been discussed byZhou et al. (2014a) andmayhave some connections
with previous opinions on the phenomenological feature of subjective time (Woodrow, 1951;
Gibson, 1975). Given that the spatiotemporal context often determines how stimuli are perceptually
organized andperceived (Kramer andYantis, 1997;Wagemans et al., 2012), it is important to consider
the perceptual organization and its relationship to subjective time when one tries to understand the
mechanisms underpinning various temporal phenomena.
Sub-Second Time is Modulated by Perceptual Organization
Traditionally, the temporal signature of an event is examined separately from the content of that
event, with the assumption that time and object features are represented by independent neural
substrates (e.g., Pöppel, 1997, 2009). This independence, however, may not be true, considering that
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temporal information is most likely decoded from neural signals
which process object features. The spiking patterns and the signal-
to-noise ratio of neural activities involved in object perception
thus may have an influence on the temporal decoding processes.
This argument is consistent with the view that the encoding of
object-identity is one of the fundamental requirements to unify
different temporal phenomena (Zhou et al., 2014a). Relevant
opinions are also expressed as the hypothesis that neural coding
efficiency offers a basis of subjective time (Eagleman and Pariya-
dath, 2009). More detailed models suggest that subjective time
is the output of multi-stage processes with context dependent
circuits interacting with the core temporal machinery (Merchant
et al., 2013). In our view, the context dependent stages include
object perception processes and provide feeding signals for the
computation that may function at the central stage. What is per-
ceptually represented (i.e., the content) may alter the interaction
and thus modulate how the signals are decoded.
Previous studies have accumulated evidence supporting the
association of object processes and perceived time; for exam-
ple, apparent duration of a visual stimulus is modulated by a
preceding prime stimulus (Zhou et al., 2010). When the stimulus-
onset-asynchrony (SOA) is less than 40 ms, the prime (like a
disk) is likely masked by and integrated with the target (a ring
with inner diameter matching the diameter of the disk), leading
to expanded duration of the target. However, when the SOA
increases, the prime is consciously perceived and segmented from
the target, resulting in duration compression. It appears that the
perceptual organization between successive stimuli distorts the
apparent duration of the stimulus. A similar illusion, in a form of
chronostasis, can be demonstrated in situations where a voluntary
action, such as a saccadic (Yarrow et al., 2001, 2004) or a manual
(Park et al., 2003; Yarrow and Rothwell, 2003) movement, triggers
the onset of a stimulus whose subjective duration is ultimately
expanded relative to succeeding stimuli with the same physical
durations. It is assumed that the illusory duration is substanti-
ated by a mechanism to solve the uncertainty about the sensory
onset caused bymovement. However, other observations show the
generalization of a chronostasis-like effect in audition and vision
without voluntary action (Hodinott-Hill et al., 2002; Alexander
et al., 2005; Hunt et al., 2008), indicating that motor action is
neither necessary nor sufficient to produce chronostasis. Instead,
more general functions such as arousal level, attention, and mem-
ory are proposed to account for the induced temporal dilation.
Although these notions are intriguing, they may not cover the
entire picture. A likely alternative is that both action-triggered
and featural changes modulate the perceptual organization of the
stimulus sequence that ultimately shape the object perception and
the perceived duration of the target. Observers usually compare
the relative duration of the target with that of other stimuli in
the train, and it is arguable that the neural system segments the
stimulus train and then estimates the target duration based on
the average of comparison stimuli. Indeed, some studies have
shown that visual temporal averaging (Ohyama and Watanabe,
2007) and auditory rhythmic grouping (Thorpe and Trehub, 1989;
Geiser and Gabrieli, 2013) alter the temporal structure of stimulus
patterns and lead to relatively longer subjective intervals between
compared to within perceptual groups. Our own studies with
double stimuli also reveal the role of segmentation and grouping
of two visual events on the apparent duration of the second event
(Zhou et al., 2010, 2014b). Interestingly, the subjective duration
is modulated by the dominant grouping principle (Zhou et al.,
2014b), thusmanifests different patterns under various perceptual
contexts.
It should be noted that the perceptual organization account
does not conflict with other explanations of time distortion for
brief intervals and durations. As a fundamental component of
neural functions, perceptual organization profoundly interacts
with other cognitive operations such as attention (Han et al.,
2005; de Haan and Rorden, 2010), memory, and prior experi-
ence (Kimchi and Hadad, 2002; Zemel et al., 2002; Peterson and
Berryhill, 2013). In a sense, perceptual organization under various
influences sets the quality and content of our perceptual expe-
riences (Herzog and Fahle, 2002; Wagemans et al., 2012), which
may further serve as signals for the appreciation of elapsed time.
On the basis of functional taxonomy (Pöppel, 1989), perceptual
organization and temporal processing are logistical functions,
whereas percepts represent content functions. Logistical functions
usually modulate the way of contents being organized in content
functions. There seems a loop that logistical functions influence
content functions, which in turn carve the phenomenal represen-
tation of the former (Bao et al., 2013). Similar loop effects can
be applied between logistical functions and other content func-
tions, e.g., between the temporal organization and the content of
memories. How does such loop implement itself using the “neural
language”? A hypothesis advanced by Eagleman and Pariyadath
(2009) may provide some clues; they argue that the consumed
neural energy signals the length of the subjective duration, and
neural repetition suppression is most probably underlying the
time compression of repeated events. An oddball (Tse et al., 2004;
Pariyadath and Eagleman, 2007, 2012; New and Scholl, 2009) or
behaviorally salient stimulus (van Wassenhove et al., 2008; New
and Scholl, 2009; Wittmann et al., 2010) can somehow escape the
repetition suppression, thus leading to dilated apparent duration
(relative to repeated stimuli). On the functional level, “oddball
effects” may result from stimulus regularity and predictability
(Pariyadath and Eagleman, 2007; Schindel et al., 2011) which nev-
ertheless control the way of stimuli being perceptually organized.
At what extent a stimulus can be segmented from other stimuli
depends on its perceptual relation with others, on its ecological
significance, or on its position in the stimulus stream. The finding
that the duration of oddballs (Tse et al., 2004; Pariyadath and
Eagleman, 2007, 2012), looming events (van Wassenhove et al.,
2008; New and Scholl, 2009;Wittmann et al., 2010), and the first or
last stimulus of a stream (Rose and Summers, 1995) is often over-
estimated may depend on their efficiency being separated from
background events. The consequence of such process is the altered
neural representation of these objects, and on the basis of the
neural energy hypothesis (Eagleman and Pariyadath, 2009) their
apparent durations. Similar within-sequence perceptual context
and organization may also mediate the duration effect caused by
speed changes even when the average speed is stable (Matthews,
2011a; Sasaki et al., 2013). Focusing on the relationship between
subjective duration and perceptual organization highlights the
importance of heuristic contexts and retrospective analyses on
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tracking events’ time. Thus, not only immediate contexts but
also task environments can modulate the apparent duration of a
stimulus (Pariyadath and Eagleman, 2007; Jazayeri and Shadlen,
2010; Matthews, 2011b; Zhou et al., 2014b).
As discussed above, perceptual organization modulates subjec-
tive duration via its role on shaping the representation of objects;
it is natural to ask whether object features are also able to modify
the perceived lapse of time. Answering this question, the apparent
duration of a stimulus has been reported to link with its size
(Xuan et al., 2007; Ono and Kitazawa, 2009; Alards-Tomalin et al.,
2014), intensity (Nisly and Wasserman, 1989; Xuan et al., 2007),
number of elements (Xuan et al., 2007), and spatial frequency
(Aaen-Stockdale et al., 2011). Interestingly, psychological time
is associated with perceived qualities and quantities of objects
(Ono and Kawahara, 2007; Matthews et al., 2011; Yamamoto and
Miura, 2012), rather than their physical properties. For example,
a central circle appears to last longer when it is surrounded by
smaller than by larger circles, although it has physically identi-
cal size and duration in both conditions (Ono and Kawahara,
2007). This effect is attributed to the different apparent sizes of
the central circle induced by surrounding circles, a phenomenon
termed Ebbinghaus illusion. In another study (Orgs et al., 2011),
viewing an implied body, but not non-body or inverted-body,
motion compresses subjective time. Interestingly, the compres-
sion effect depends on the apparent length of movement paths.
Taken together with the observations in oddball and repetition
paradigms, these findings strongly suggest that perceptual orga-
nization operating on both spatial and temporal domains influ-
ences how the target is temporally represented relative to other
objects. This view exploits factors that shape the mental time
from the point of perceptual functions and provides a useful
supplement to other more biological concepts and hypotheses
advocated previously (Eagleman andPariyadath, 2009; Zhou et al.,
2014a). Considering its dependence on neural signals encoding
objects and their identities aswell as its behavioral correlationwith
perceived object properties, subjective time can be treated as an
object feature that is indirectly computed but nevertheless can be
used to tag the object identity.
Subjective Time Can Serve as a Research
Tool to Examine Neural Representations
of Objects
The association between the perceptual representation of objects
and perceived time implies an important application of subjective
time in the assessment of various mental processes. One can refer
to the broad use of reaction time (RT) and its success in revealing
characteristics of a variety of perceptual and cognitive operations
since the beginning of experimental psychology (Pöppel, 1997;
MacDonald and Meck, 2004; Posner, 2005). For a response to
occur, accumulated neural signals, either detection or discrimina-
tion information, should reach a decision criterion which varies
across trials but on average keeps stable for certain task sessions
(Grice et al., 1982; Usher and McClelland, 2001). Usually, more
strongly perceived objects lead to shorter RTs (Donner and Fager-
holm, 2003; Palmer et al., 2005). Therefore, by inspecting RTs, one
may obtain rich information about the neural codes of external
inputs or the cognitive structures processing these inputs. In a
similar vein, one can compare apparent durations of different
objects under the same condition or of the same object under dif-
ferent conditions to study object representation and related neural
processes. For example, Zhou et al. (2014b) presented observers
two successive Gabor patches with varying orientation differences
or spatial distances across trials. The apparent duration of the
second Gabor patch is underestimated relative to its physical
duration. Interestingly, the amount of duration compression is
positively related to the size of orientation difference and spatial
distance, in a way consistent with the orientation tuning and
retinotopic mapping of early visual neurons. Similar results are
also reported by Pariyadath and Eagleman (2012) when using an
oddball paradigm. Thus, properties of the visual cortex can be
inferred from the perceived duration of a visual stimulus without
adaptation manipulation or neurophysiological recordings. The
application of this concept can be found in another study (Aaen-
Stockdale et al., 2011). In a typical oddball paradigm, observers
compared the relative duration of an infrequent oddball (a Gabor
patch) and that of a frequent standard which could be either
another Gabor patch with different spatial frequency or an audi-
tory stimulus. The authors found an interesting result that the
duration expansion or compression of the oddball depended on its
spatial frequency. Relative to lower and higher spatial frequencies,
a mid-range spatial frequency (ca. 2 c/deg) consistently led to
longer apparent duration that was invariant across different base-
line durations. The perceived time in this example thus indicates
that longer visual persistence is associated with neural responses
selective to mid-range spatial frequencies in the early visual
cortices. Other reports demonstrate spatially localized duration
effects for drifting gratings and suggest neural sources in visual
areas of striate and dorsal extrastriate cortices where neurons
have specific receptive fields for moving objects (Johnston et al.,
2006; Burr et al., 2007; Bruno et al., 2010). For more complex
events, such as biologically relevant stimuli, studying apparent
time also helps to uncover the neural processes involved in encod-
ing these events (Wang and Jiang, 2012; Yamamoto and Miura,
2012). It has been found that merely observing the movement
of another organism activates the mirror neuron system of the
primate brain (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). The question is
whether a static image with implied motion also activates mir-
ror neurons. Utilizing a duration judgment task, Yamamoto and
Miura (2012) provide a positive answer that stationary images
potentially dilate subjective time when they imply the running
rather than the standing of a character. Such time effect suggests
enhanced responses of mirror neurons induced by a static image
with implied biological motion. In another study with point-
light walker animation (Wang and Jiang, 2012), time expansion is
associated with stimuli containing biological motion components,
even when observers are unaware of their biological nature. Thus,
apparent duration serves as a sensitive assessment of life-relevant
signals and their neural substrates. However, one has to be cau-
tious when employing subjective time as a tool. Various factors
including stimulus features, contexts, and drug administration
are known to influence time perception (Meck, 1996; Eagleman,
2008) and distributed brain areas are suggested to engage in the
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coding of subjective time (Mauk andBuonomano, 2004;Merchant
et al., 2013). Therefore, it is a challenge to specify neural activities
which are reflected in perceived time. This limitation calls for
careful design of experiments to control possible confounding
factors. Consulting well-established physiological and functional
properties of certain neural structures may provide help in using
perceived time as a research tool.
There is another advantage to measuring apparent time in
psychological and neuroscience research. Object features and
identities can be processed rapidly within the first tens to hun-
dreds milliseconds after stimulus onsets (Thorpe et al., 1996).
Thus, conventional RTs primarily reflect the state of transient
neural responses caused by onsets. On the other hand, duration
perception needs more information that can track the lapse of
event. Not only onset transients, but also sustained responses and
offset transients are involved in the temporal computation. Neu-
rophysiological studies have argued that gradual changes of neural
responses, e.g., ramping activities, over frontal and parietal areas
serve the neural representation of mental time (see a review by
Wittmann, 2013). Although such notion needs further elaboration
to accommodate current doubts and inconsistencies, it is clear that
certain sustained neural responses are forwarded as time signals
which could be used for phenomenal representation. To this end,
apparent time serves as a tool to assess, at least partially, the
sustained neural responses between onset and offset transients.
However, it is important to notice that there is currently no clear
delineation between the contributions of transient and sustained
signals to subjective time. Considering that properties of onset
transients, mainly their amplitudes, profoundly alter the repre-
sentation of brief time intervals (Noguchi and Kakigi, 2006; Terao
et al., 2008), this challenge will significantly limit the application
of subjective time in studies of sustained neural responses.
Concluding Remarks
Perceptual organization is an essential component of the efficient
coding of the world. Here, we highlight its role in modulating
the temporal representation of objects and explore its biological
consequences which might underlie experiences of brief time. As
a way to structure the sensory inputs, perceptual organization
modifies the neural responses as well as the homeostatic condi-
tions induced by an object. Altered biological states may change
the information that is transformed into a feeling of lasting long
or short (Eagleman and Pariyadath, 2009; Wittmann, 2009; Zhou
et al., 2014a). In this view, perceptual organization unifies a num-
ber of time illusions on a common principle and further enables
us to predict the apparent duration in a given context. The retro-
spective and context-dependent nature also suggests that the link
between perceptual organization and subjective time is applicable
in time judgment not only for online objects but also for memo-
rized events. Using subjective time as a research tool, on the other
hand, complements other behavioral measurements such as RT
paradigms.With this method, it is also possible to investigate both
transient and sustained neural responses encoding object identity.
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